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SHIRKING OR PRODUCTIVE SCHMOOZING:WAGESANDTHEALLOCATIONOFTIME AT WORK
ABSTRACT
Major strands of recent macroeconomic theory hinge on the relation of
workers' efforts to their wages, but there has been no direct general evidence
onthis relation. This study uses data from household surveys for 1975 and1981
that include detailed time diaries to examine how changes in the use of time on
the job affect wages. Additional time spent by the average worker relaxing at
work has no impact on earnings (and is presumably unproductive). Additional on-
the-job leisure does raise earnings of workers whose break time is very short.
Only among union workers •forwhom additional leisure time (in unscheduled
breaks only) appears productive, does this pattern differ. The results suggest
that further growth in on-the-job leisure will reduce productivity (output per
hour paid-for), that monitoring workers can yield returns to the firm, but that




East Lansing, MI 48824I. Introduction
Since World War II there has been a rapid increase in two types of leisure
that may affect workers' productivity while they are actually working. The
first of these is the well-known increase in paid timeofffrom work -- -
vacations,holidays and sick days. In larger manufacturing firms (U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, 1953. 1987) this type of payment for not working increased from 5.4
percent of total payroll cost in 1953 to 10.2 percent in 1986. (Comparable
figures for paid holidays and sick time alone are 2.1 and 4.4 percent.) The
less well-known source of increase is the rise in time spent at work but not
working. In the same survey this source of paid on-the-job leisure increased
from 2.1 to 3.3 percent of payroll costs.
In Hamermesh (1986) I analyzed workers' demand for mixing work with
leisure on the job and paid leisure off the job. However, no one has examined
how on-the-job leisure affects production or the demand side of the labor market.1
Time spent on the job relaxing (loafing?) can increase workers' productivity by
enabling them to rest when they are physically or mentally fatigued. To the
extent that this productivity-enhancing effect exists, it has implications for
issues of interest to labor economists and economists generally. First, and
simplest,how doesthe structure of pay differ along the dimension of the
allocationof timeat work?That is, do we observe pay differences that are
related to the amount of timeworkers spend onscheduled and unscheduledbreaks?
Of particular recent interest to macroeconomists and labor economists too
has been the role of shirking on the job and the incentives shirking gives
employers to institute monitoring schemes. This question also speaks, though
less directly, to the issue of efficiency wages. Yet in the burgeoning
literature on the role of wage differentials in affecting worker productivity
the evidence supporting the hypothesis is the documentation of interf iris wage
1differentials unexplained by conventional human capital, demographic and other
variables (Krueger-Suz.ners, 1988). The hypothesis is based on how time is used
in the work place; but no evidence on time use is provided. This is the first
comprehensive study to relate time use to wages.
Alternative uses of time on the job also affect predictions about the
impacts of various labor-market policies. Legislated reductions in the standard
workweek will affect the relative demand for workers and hours differently
depending on the current productivity of slack time in the work place (see Hart,
1987. p. 53). The more productive slack time is, the smaller is the margin
available to employers for increasing the efficiency of hours paid for in
response to an imposed change in standard hours. Increases in wage rates, be
they legislated or bargained, are more costly to employers, and will have a
greater disemployment effect, the lower the productivity of time on the Job.
Understanding the effects of on-the-job leisure on productivity informs us about
the structure of the demand for workers and thus about the possible impacts of
such policies as overtime pay requirements, payroll taxes, and minimum wages.
In Section II I review the work of industrial engineers and psychologists
on the effects of alternative uses of timeonthe job on worker performance.
Thisevidence is used to motivate an implicit-contract model in which workers
andfirms sortthemselves according to their tastes and technologies defined
overtime use on the job. In Section III I describe the data used to examine
the issues and present the equations that will be estimated.Section IVprovides
the evidence on how time is used and its effects on productivity, essentially
answering whether on-the-job leisure is shirking or represents productive
schmoozing -- - socializingwith workmates that adds to productivity (see Schrank,
1978). Section V draws inferences from the results for pay structure, shirking
modelsand trends in timeuse.
2II. Background and Theory
As far back as Florence (1924) industrial engineers have charted the paths
of output, spoilage and other indicators of physical productivity as functions
of the length of time the employee has been producing during the day. The
evidence suggests that accident rates and work spoilage are lowest after breaks
and atthestart of a shift, and that output is highest at those times. A huge
literature in industrial psychology (see McCormick-Ilgen, 1985, for a suimsary)
hasexaminedthe effects of rest periodsonthe job on fatigue,boredom and
othercounterproductive reactions. Among workers engaged in physical tasks
there is clear physiological evidence of reductions in work capacity occurring
at lover levels of rest andbreaktime.Amongworkers in sedentary jobs no such
physiologicalevidence exists. Those workers do, however, report feelings of
fatigue when deprived of rest periods, and the literature indicates that there
are psychological benefits from rest periods that may enhance the well-being of
these workers and hence their productivity.
This evidence isclearly important; but its implications for labor-market
outcomesare not entirely clear. What is required is some consideration of how
timeuse on thejob affects the rewards -- higherwages -- - thatare the returns
to productive uses of time on the job. Unless worker productivity is independent
of the way time is used on the job, the phenomena must be modelled as being
jointly determined by workers and employers.
Considerfirst a simple modelof the choice of hours of productive work
andwages in a world of homogeneous workers and a representive firm amongthose
where leisure on the job is possible. The firm operates in a competitive product
market. I ignore shirking/monitoring in this simplemodel.Let production Ybe
characterizedby:(1) Y —Y(I1,b(H-
whereH is normal (non-break) hours per worker, bsl is a parameter indicating
the productivity of on-the-job leisure, and H is the fixed amount of hours paid
for in the firm. I make the assumptions that Y1(x,x) >Y(x,x)0, i.e.,
that the marginal minute of work is uniformly more productive than the same
marginal minute of on-the-job leisure. Normalizing the product price at one,
and assuming that the firm has already decided how many workers to employ, I
assume it maximizes (Y -WHI subjectto:
U(WIf, H-He) U(f, 0)
where U is the representative worker's utility function, U is the wage the firm
pays, and 1* is earnings available in jobs where no on-the-job leisure is




Depending on preferences and the sizes of Y1andY2, the jointly-maximizing
value of H,, can be less than H.
The comparative-static question of interest here is the effect of an
increase in b, the productivity of on-the-job leisure, on the equilibrium values
of U and H,,. One can show that an increase in b lowers both U and H,, given a
fixed H. Essentially, a higher b encourages the firm to substitute on-the-job
leisure for normal work, and it can still attract workers at a lower wage rate
because the workers are more than willing to trade off reduced normal work for
increased on-the-job leisure.
This model yields little that is testable, as we cannot observe b to link
it to combinations ofandfl,,.Itdoes, though, provide the basis for
analyzing a more useful model, one characterizing an economy with heterogeneous
4firms and workers in which shirking is possible and firms spend resources on
monitoring their employees. Consider firm l's production technology:
(2)
— b[H"-H1]).
Eachfirm has a differentproduction technology. Y1. Firms cannot measure as
wellasworkers, though they can observe the results of a low H. Accordingly.




The firm uses its resources to monitor workers and improve its probability
of catching slackers. I model this in terms of the probability of a worker being
fired, p(H, Mi), with p1<O, and with increasing M reducing the dispersionof
p over the range of H,, between 0 andH". Workers j maximize utility defined
over the probability of keeping the job in firm i:
—[l-p)U(WH.H"-lç) +pU(I".0).
Each firm maximizes profits subject to the competitively determined market locus
shown in Figure 1 in W- -space.The firm's isoprofit curves slope upward
because it canoffera higher wage rate if itcan induce its workers to spend
moretime on the job engaged in normal work. Workers' indifference curves slope
upward becauseworkers mustreceivea higher wage rate to be induced to forego
more oftheir on-the-job leisure. As a result of both sets of behavior, WW, the
market locus ofequilibrium combinations(W, 4),alsoslopes upward. With a
fixedH" this meansthatthe locus of equilibrium combinationsof wages and on-
the-jobleisure,and .4i,slopesdownward. Implicit in this maximization
isan equilibrium amount of spending on detecting shirking. M.
Consider what happens if b rises in each firm, while workers' preferences
for spending time in on-the-job leisure rather than work remain unchanged. At
the old equilibria the value of a dollar spent on detecting shirking decreases.
because on-the-job leisure is now more productive, competition among firmsfor
5w
Figure 1. The Wage—Actual Work Time Locus
WI
liiworkers forces employers to raise the wage at each level of less than H*.
The competitive pressures are especially increased among firms that had already
chosen a low H,, (and a high iijj)• for the productivity gains are greatest in
those firms. (In the extreme, at a firm in which H,, —H*,a small increase in
will not change the firm's choices of W and H,,.) The market locus in
Figure 1 thus rises and rotates clockwise, becoming W%J,whenon-the-job leisure
becomes more productive. Obversely, the negatively sloped locus of equilibrium
H
combinations of U and 4becomesflatter also.
H
A simple way to see this result is to abandon our obsession with labor
supply and assumethatworkers are indifferent between time spent at work in
alternative uses, be they productive or just loafing. In that case the market
locus inFigure 1 would slope upward solely because employers whouse a more
loafing-intensivetechnology will have lower output than otherwise identical
firmsthat have higher !4.Theycan remainin business only by paying lower
wages than other employers. If on-the-job loafing becomes more productive.
competition will pressure them to raise wages. In the extreme case, in which we
continue the assumption that workers are indifferent among uses of time on the
job, but assume that all time uses are equally productive, the market locusin
Figure1becomes horizontal.
This observation on the possible effects of productive on-the-job leisure
in an implicit market gives a specific prediction: The more productive is on-
the-job leisure, the flatter will be the market locus relating the wage rateto
hours actually worked, holding total hours on the job constant. This means that
the market locus relating wage rates and on-the-job leisure will also be flatter,
other things (including total hours) equal, the more productive is on-the-job
leisure. In the next Section I discuss ways of implementing these observations.
6III. DataandEstimating Equations
The model to be estimated is of the standard form:
(4) in W —0(1,T)
where X is a vector of control variables, and T is a vector of variables that
measure alternative uses of time on the job, including H,, and H1. It is easier
to estimate some of the versions of (4) by entering the time spent in each
alternative use separately than by including total timeon thejob and the
fractionspent on breaks. This requires a slight reinterpretation of the results
in Section II, since total hours at work are not held constant. At theextreme,
inwhich on-the-job leisure is as productive as normal working time (is identical
to it from the employer's standpoint), demand forces alone would make the slopes
of both loci the same (and positiveifworkers dislike spending more time on the
job). However, if marginal workers find on-the-job leisure less unattractive
than normal working time, we will still observe a higher positive slope for the
wage- -working time marketlocusthan for the wage- -on-the-job leisure market
locus. The discussion in Section IIsuggested that, for a given distribution of
tastes for normalwork and on-the-job leisure, higher productivity of the latter
will cause 3lnW/8H1 to approach alnw/aIç.2 In the extreme case, if workers'
distastes for time on the job are distributed independently of how that time is
used, the estimated differences in these slopes will be perfect measures of the
relative productivity of on-the-job leisure and normal working time. If the
marginalworker has a greater distaste for additionalnormalworking time than
for additionalon-the-jobleisure, then 8mw/aM1 <alnW/aIçeven if the two uses
oftime are equally productive.
This discussion illustrates the difficulty of drawing inferences about the
relative productivity of alternative uses of time on the job.3Wesimply cannot
be sure that any differences in the slopes that we do observe areattributable to
7differences in productivity rather than to differences induced by workers sorting
themselves into various jobs according to their relative tastes for normal time
atwork and on-the-job leisure. Clearly, if we found ölnW/3111 << alnW/aIç, we could
interpret that result as reflecting the different relative productivity of the two
activities, different relative tastes for the two activities, or some combination
of both. In interpreting the results I shall make the extreme assumption that
workers find time spent at work equally distasteful regardless of whether it is
spent in normal work activity or in on-the-job leisure. This is not necessarily
correct, but I leave ittothereaderto decide how large are the potential
biasesthat this assumption imparts to my conclusions about the relative product-
ivityof the alternative uses of time onthe job. So long as on-the-job leisure
isnot more attractive to workers than off-the-job leisure, thougi, we should
observe that amy/oH1 > 0 if OTJ leisure is productive.
The model assumes that the productivity of workers' uses of time onthe
jobis reflected in thewage rates theyreceive. The output of this estimation
isthus anupper bound onthe difference between the productivity of normal
working time and on-the-job leisure. If this upper bound is low ---anhour of
this type of leisure has nearly the same effect on wages as does normal work -- -
wemayinfer that OTJ leisureis a productive useoftimeonthe job for which
employers are willing to pay. This inference would suggest thatatleast some
shirking on the job doesnotharm a firm's profitability. It would provide some
evidence that the role of expenditures on monitoring workers has been overstated
and wouldundercut the importanceofshirking/monitoring as an explanationfor
various labor-market phenomena. If, however, the upper bound is large, we may
be fairly surethat OTJleisure is not productive, especially given our
assumptionsaboutworkers' indifferenceamong uses of time onthe job.
8The empirical examination of time useonthe job is conducted on data from
the1975-76Time Use Study(Juster etal, 1979) and from the 1975-81 TimeUse
Panel Study (Juster etal, 1983). These data sets do not appear to have been
used by economists outside thegroupthat collected the data;andamong the
purposestowhich they have beenput,only one study, Stafford-Duncan(1980b),
examined time use on the job. The extract that underlay that studywas quite
similarto the one I create from the 1975-76 sample, but those authors did not
analyze the relation between wages and alternative uses of time on the job.
The1975-76 Study obtained data from four days of timediaries kept by
membersof 1519 households. Thedays were at three-month intervals, with two
being weekdays, onea Saturday and the fourth a Sunday.The data on time use
are coubined into synthetic weeks, and it is these that I use in estimating
(4). The 1975-81 Panel Data were collected similarly, with follow-up diaries
keptfor four days (again, at three-month intervals) in 1981 by 620 of the
households that were included in the1975-76survey.
In the 1975-76 diaries workers could categorize time on the job as: Normal
work;work at second job; lunch at work; coffee breaks; and other breaks
breaksbefore regular work, after regular work, or other breaks during work.
Inthe1981 follow-up survey information on normal work time at home was also
collected, and separate totals were reported for the three components of other
breaks. Reporting ofbreak timedoes notmerely include scheduled on-the-job
leisure, but insteadis designed to reflect all non-normal working time whileon
thejob.Because of this, and because timeuse isreported by theworker,the
data on timeuse shouldinclude muchofwhat economists could regard as time
spentshirking. This is especially likely to bethe casefor the less structured
category, other breaks. Anypositive effects on wages of additional time spent
9in other breaks would be an especially strong indication that on-the-job leisure
is productive.
Thedataonhousehold heads in the surveys formed the basis for the
analysis. Only those whorespondedthat their weekly work hours on the main job
were atleast 20 during each of the four interview waves in 1975-76 and whose
actual normal work time (in the time diaries) exceeded 15 hours on that job in
the synthetic week were included in the extract. Also, in order to ensure that
the data describe the same workplace, only workers who kept the same employer
throughoutthe interviewyear were included. These disqualifiers accounted for
mostof the reductions in the nuther of data points, with the remaining reductions
duetothe exclusion of household heads for whom substantial amounts(atleast
ome full day out of the four) of time-use informationwas missing,or for whom
dataon one of the Ivariableswas notreported. Taken together, the exclusions
resulted in 343usable observations from the 1975-76 Time Use Study.4 Of these,
311were employees, and 276 were employees whose only earnings were wages or
salaries. The statistics and estimates are reported for all three subsamples.
These same 343 people formed the basis of the subsample from the Panel
Study. With the same exclusions -- - thatthe individual did notchangeemployers
during1981(though the employerin 1981 could differ from that in 1975-76); that
therespondent stated that he or she worked at least at least 20 hours perweek
in1980 when working and the time diaires showed at least 15 hours of normal
worktime; and that data on X be available --- theusable subsample contained
92individuals, of whom81were employees. Eecause of the small size of the
panel,breaking the subsample into still finer groups made no sense.
Thevector I includesall the variables that have become standard
controlsin wage equations and for which the Time Use Study and the Panel Study
provide information. Thus educational attainment, years of labor-market
10experience (including a quadratic), self-reported health status, union membership,
marital status (currently married or not), location in the South, whether in a
large metropolitan area, and vectors of duumiy variables for one-digit occupation
and industry were all used as controls in estimating (4).
Normal work measures time(inminutes) reported for thesyntheticweek
(based on the four daily diaries). For the observations in 1981 this measure
includes work time at home.6 Equation (4) is estimated using reported break time
in the three categories -- - lunch,coffee and other -- - separately,as well as
with an aggregate of time spent on these three activities. The wage measure is
monthly pay, and the dependent variable in all estimation is the logarithm of
monthlypay. This is calculated as the sum of reported earningson the particular
job duringa recent month and the monthly bonus received during that month.
IV. Wages and Time on the Job
A.TheTimeUse Study, 1975-76
Table1 presents descriptive characteristics of the three subsamples from
the 1975-76 Time Use Study. In addition, I present separate data for union and
nonunion employees. The four categories defining time use on the job are listed
in minutes per week. Together the data from the time diariestotal 42.5 hours
perweek, somewhat less than the 44.0 hours that sample members report when asked
how much time they usually work per week.' This discrepancy suggests that
CPS-typedata overestimate the amountof time devoted to market production and
leadoneto underestimate the amount of time spent in householdproductionand
leisure. The allocations of time on the job do not differ much among the three
subsamples. However, unionized workers took distinctly more other break time on
the job than did nonunionworkers, and coffee breaks weremore widely available
and/or longer among unionized workers.
11Table 1
Moans and TheirStandardDeviet boa, 1975—76 Ti.e UseStudy
All uployees Kployees K.ployees,
Union Nonunion Wages ily
WeeklyMinutes of:
Norsal Work 2345 2310 2234 2336 2313
(37) (37) (75) (43) (40)
Lunch Breaks 107 112 109 113 112
(6) (6) (ii) (7) (6)
('.offee Breaks 54 56 62 54 56
(6) (4) (8) (5) (4)
Other Breaks 43 46 56 43 48
(before, after, other) (4) (6) (9) (8) (7)
Usual Weekly Hours, 44.0 43.2 42.8 43.3 43.0
Main Job (.6) (.6) (.93) (.63) .5
Pay Per Month 1121 1043 1014 1053 968
(54) (42) (45) (54) (35)
Age 38.70 38.47 37.96 38.64 38.74
(.63) (.65) (1.23) (.77) (.69)
Education 12.80 12.75 12.32 12.89 12.67
(.14) (.15) (.33) (.16) (.16)
Union .23 .25 .26
(.02) (.02) (.03)
N— 343 311 78 233 276Are the data on break times reasonable? Consider first their means. The
total weekly break time, 214 minutes for employees, seems at first glance to be
disturbingly low (less than 45 minutes per working day for the average employee).
It is quite comparable, thougt, with other available data. The Chamber of
Commerce survey (1987, Table 4)oflarger firmsshowsthat only 3.4percentof
payrollcosts are accounted for by lunch, coffee and other paid breaks. Assuming
a forty-hour week, this means those paid breaks totalled only 82 minutes per
week. Even if onlyhalf of the 168 minutes of coffee andlunchbreaks reported
byemployees in our sample are paid for, we may conclude that the Time Use Study
does not understate break time.
Nowconsider the variability of break time across the days on which the
workers kept diaries. (Remember that the typical respondent kept time diaries
fortwo work days.) The averagecorrelation between timeoncoffee breaks within
apair of diary days was .32 for the sample of 343 workers. For lunch breaksit
was.27,andforthe less structured other breaks it was .16. These correlations
are significant, suggesting the data are not just noise. That the correlation
is lower for other breaks is consistent with their less formal nature.
The differences in diary times between workers in the largest subsample
aM the sample consisting of employees only are striking. Self-employed workers,
excludedfromthe second subsample, reported 2685 minutes of normal work, but
only117 minutes of break time.Self-employedworkers, who presumably determine
their own break time to maximize productivity, spend only half as much timeon
breaksas employees, and they do this during a longer workweek.
The demographic characteristics on which Table I provides information (and
others not shown) suggest the subsamples are quite typical along most dimensions.
The workers' average age and educational attainment are rougi1y what oneobserves
12for steady workers in subsamples from other large micro data sets. Employees in
this subsample are unionized at roughly the same rate as were all nonfarm
employees in 1976 (see Hainensesh-Rees, 1988. P. 247). Along the dimensions of
the other control variables too, members of this subsample are representative of
household heads in the mid-1970s.
In Table 2 I show the parameter estimates of (4) for the various subsamples.
Before comnenting on the returnstoalternative timeuseson the job, it is worth
notingthat thereturnstoother characteristics of the workers accord with
thosefound in earnings regressions on other sets ofdata.' The effects of
normalworking time on earnings are positive and usually significant. For the
entire subsample an additional hour of normal working time in a typical week
raises earnings by .71 percent. Thus the marginal benefit from additional normal
work is positive, though it is well below the average wage in this subsample.
For none of the three types of breaks is the marginal effect of additional
time significantly positive in the three main subsamples. Indeed, in the least-
structured category of self-reported break time -- - otherbreaks -- - themarginal
impact is negative and almost significant at conventional levels. From the
results in Table2 onewould infer that time spent at work but not working is
entirelyunproductive ---ithas no impact on monthly earnings. This would
implythat, to the extent thatbreaksare not contractual (explicit or implicit)
benefits, it pays employers to spend resources on monitoring workers to induce
them to shift timefromunproductive breaks to productive normalwork.
The results for lunch and coffee breaks are similar for union and nonunion
workers. For other breaks, though, the effects on wages are strikingly and
significantly different. Among nonunion workers the effect is negative:
Additional other breaks reduce monthly pay. Among union workers additional
other breaks raise monthly pay. Given the rigid structuring of union jobs, this
13hIe 2
of dLc %e p't.r4ti 1975-76 1e Study!(
Ml
tbnil Srk 1.143 x io'4 .639 x ICT'4 —.094 x ici'4 .503x icr' .85x icr'4
(2.58) (1.42) (—.10) (.94) (1.90)
lunch Ics 1.143 x io'43.444 x i'4 1.330 x icr'44.741x io 3.095 x
(.44) (1.24) (.20) (1.51) (1.13)
ffes &eaks 2.289 x IO'4—.165 x 1O —2.525 x icr'41.695 x UT'41.5551a'4
(.58) (—.04) (—.30) (.38) (.39)
Other &eaks —3.591 x io'4 —4.239 x i'417.390 x i(T4 -6.448 x i(T4 —3.424 x io'4
(—1.31) (—1.65) (2.43) (—2.29) (—1.38)
.410 .391 .202 .447 .387
1.px1ent riab1e is the 1orithe of pay per xith. t-statistica are in parentheses bel
the parater estintes here and in Tables 3, 67.Alsoixx1xIed in the regressi are enaes
of e&ratfon, eaperlence, health, *xilon and usrital status, sex, regicoal and ustropalitan location,
and ctcs of wrlables for 1-digit ocojpat1 and iM3stzy.effect should not be too surprising. Unscheduled breaks are the workers'
necessary and productive responses to the rigidity. This view is consistent
with the notion (Stafford-Duncan, 1980a) that higher union wages are in part a
compensating differential for the structure of work. In the less rigidiy
structured nonunion sector, these unscheduled breaks detract from performance.
These results clearly suggest that OTJ leisure is shirking among nonunion
workers, but may be productive leisure among unionized employees.9
Before accepting these conclusions we should investigate their robustness
in light of the evidence from industrial psychology cited in Section II that
error rates, accidents, etc. improve following breaks in long spells of continual
work. It may be that a few short breaks throughout the day raise productivity
in nonunion jobs too, even thoughtheaverage minute of time spent in breaks is
notproductive. To investigate this conclusion I reestimated (4) by combining
the threecategories of break time into one, H1, and by adding quadratic terms in
normal working time and break time, and an interaction term between H and H1.1°
The marginal impacts of H,, and H1 on earnings at their minima, means and
maxima are shown in Table 3. While the results are not very strong, they tell a
somewhat different story from that suggested by the estimates in Table 2. Except
for unionized workers •theinitial minute of break time, evaluated at the mean
normal working time in the sample, does produce higher earnings (though the
effect is notverysignificant). Implicitly this mirrors perfectlytheresults
fromindustrial psychology on the declines in productivity that come with
continual, uninterrupted work. At the mean break timeinthese samples, though,
anadditional minute of break time has a much smaller positive effect on
productivity; and at the maximum break time in the sample, an additional minute
of break time reduces earnings. Among unionized workers the marginal effect of
breaks on wages is increasing.
14b1e 3
Wfectson )btily Fy of (be-(bdt L.crei..q In T1 on the Job
1975-76T1-ie&J!
All lcqeee
Ibion 1uiIon ee 1y
Evaluated
at: d(log Wage)/dJork
)n1nun —.0(X)200 —.000076 —.000239 —.000195 .(XKX)04
?bronl&& (—1.41) (—.52) (—.79) (—1.09) (.02)
.84 .000050 —.000031 .000033 .000085
?brl. %brk (1.86) (1.08) (—.32) (.62) (1.92)
.(XX)554 .000231 .343 .000432 .(XX)202
brmlrk (2.72) (1.23) (.87) (1.56) (1.10)
d(log &ige)/cJkeak
Min1mn .000402 .000454 .000007 .000538 .000553
&eak (1.47) (1.55) (.01) (1.59) (1.94)
)'ean .000219 .000220 .000419 .000263 .000302
&eak (1.07) (1.12) (.93) (1.11) (1.53)
—.001379 —.001399 .001796 —.001691 —.001557
weak (—1.78) (—1.91) (1.32) (—2.09) (—2.19)
.LBEsed onequationscontaining the sn controls as in ble2, bitwith all break thea
suimed, aed with a cxpletesecorih-orderappraxiration on onnial work break than.This extended investigation suggests that the total abolition of break
time would reduce earnings. However, the results also indicate that additional
break time beyond the average adds nothing to pay. These inferences are
buttressed by our observation that break time is much less among self-employed
workers, but that the self-employed do take some breaks. If we maintain the
assumption that the results reflect differences in productivity between normal
working time and on-the-job leisure, we can infer that, except among unionized
workers, increases in break time will be unproductive. The average minute of
time spent on the job but not in normal work is shirking rather than productive
schmoozing. However, the results also imply that employers act rationally in
not being overly zealous in monitoring workers' activities, for some break time
may be productive (and excessive monitoring could reduce productivity).
B. The Time Use Panel Study, 1975-81
There are several reasons for using panel data to explore further the
relation between pay and time use on the job. Most important, the cross-section
estimatesof theprevious subsection do not allow us to separate Out the effects
ofworker-firm specificmatches and unobserved worker characteristics that may
be correlated with the uses of time. For example, it seems quite reasonable to
expect that workers with strong tastes for on-the-job leisure will sort themselves
into firms that can provide that on-the-job leisure at little cost. We will
then observe a flatter earnings--break-time market locus, holding total hours
constant, than would be estimated if we could control for the characteristics of
the workers and the firms that affect this sorting. Also, the use of a panel of
workers allows us to examine the the stability of patterns of time use on the
job. The cost of using the Panel Study is the reduction in the number of
individualsincluded in thesubsamples."
15In Table 4 I list the means of most of the same variables shown in Table 1.
A comparison of the two tables indicates that the workers included in the
subsample from the Panel Study spent about the same time on the job as did the
average worker in the 1975-76 cross section. The mean amount of time spent in
normal work fell sharply in this subsample between 1975-76 and 1981. and the
amount of break time reported fell proportionately in both samples. While time
on lunch and coffee breaks fell, though, time spent on other breaks rose.
What is most interesting about these data is the large deviation between
time reported in the time diaries as having been spent on the job in 1981 (a
mean of 39.7 hours) and workers' responses about how many hours they worked per
week(a mean of 43.3 hours). This discrepancy is twice as great as that in the
1975-76 data (both in Table 1 and for 1975-76 for this subsample of the Panel
Study).Does this change reflect increasing overreporting of hours in CPS-like
data? It is true that the questions on usual weekly hours differed in the two
surveys, with the 1975-76 question referring to the main job at the current
time,and the 1981 question referring to weekly hours when working in 1980.12
If we restrict the sample to people with only one job, for example, to the 73
employees who held only one job in 1981, the inferences are similar: The
discrepancy between usual hours anddiary reports of total work was 1.9hours
in 1975-76, but was 3.0 hours in 1981. Another possibility is that economic
conditions differed between 1980 and 1981, so that usual hours reported for 1980
produce a biased comparison to the 1981 diary hours. The CPS data do show that
reported average hours of workers on full-time schedules were 42.8 and 42.4 in
the two years." This .4hourdecrease is notsufficientto explain the increase
inthe gap between reported and diary hours of 1.1 hours among employees with
only onejob. The onlyremaining statistical explanation is that field workers
somehowasked the questions differently in the twoyearsand thereforeelicited
16Table 4
Means and Thetr Standard Errors, WorkersIn
1975—76 and 1981 Tt.e UseStudy
Ml E.rloyees
1975—76 1981 1975—76 1981
Weekly MInutes of:
Normal Work 2344 2225 227Q 2174
(73) (6Q) (74) (69)
Lunch Breaks 104 87 107 94
(9) (9) (10) (10)
Coffee Breaks 50 46 53 46
(7) (7) (8) (7)
Other Breaks 51 63 53 67
(8) (8) (9) (9)
Usual Weekly Hours (1975—76), 44.6 44.0 43.3 43.3
MainJob;Weekly Hours (1980) (1.1) (.9) (.9) (.8)
Pay perMonth 1283 1933 1149 1853
(120) (145) (86) (108)
Union .28 .35 .31 .37
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
N q2 81substantially differentanswers. Ifthatconjecture is wrong, wemustinfernot
only that there are upward biases in reported hours of work based on responses
to questions about total working time that are contained in the major household
surveys,but that these biases may be increasing.
There is remarkable stabiliy in monthly earnings over the six years 1975-
76and 1981 amongworkersin the subsample. Table S shows the autocorrelations
are around.80.That the six-year autocorrelations of timeuse bycategory are
positive suggests thateven those data do not solelyrepresent serially
independentnoise.14 It is interesting to note in these data thatthe
autocorrelation between totalbreaktimes in the twoyearsof the panel is not
farbelowthe autocorrelation in normal working time. Also, the lowest
autocorrelationcoefficients are in other break time, the least structured
category of timeonthe job that is not spent in normalwork.
Equation(4)is estimated on the panel of two cross sections from theTime
UsePanel Study.Iassume the error structure is characterized by:
(5) —p+v , i—i N, t—l975, 1981,
where e is the error term in (4), p is the individual-job specific effect, and
uis an i.i.d. error term.15Equation(4) is estimated using a generalized least
squares estimator based upon this random-effects model. The particular estimator
used isessentially a weighted average of the "within" estimator (in this case,
based on the differences in the variables between the two observations for each
worker) and the "between" estimator (in this case, based on the averages of the
variables for each individual). (See Judge etal, 1980.) The parameters
are calculated as OLS estimates of (4) computed over observations for all N
workers for both years from which Utimes the individual meanshavebeen sub-
tractedfor all variables, where 8 is the ratio of the standard errors of the
"within" to the "between" estimators.
17Table 5
Siz—Year Autocorrelat ions, Pay and Ti.e Use
All E.ployees






WeeklyBours .537 .43RThe Lagrange Multiplier statistics that test for the presence of individual
effects in the OLS estimators of (4) on the panel data suggest that it makes
sense to worry about computing GLS estimates.16 For the sample of 92 workers
the statistic, distributed y2(l), equals 29.67; for the subsample of employees
the statistic is 32.58. both of these are highly significant, suggesting that
there is a gain to computing GLS estimates in these data.
Table 6 shows the CLS estimates of (4) with the error structure embodied
in (5).u7 The responses of earnings to increases in normalworkingtimeare
estimatedwith aboutthesameprecisionas in the cross-section data. The
responsesto increases in break time are even less precisely estimated than in
in Table 2. The GLS estimates on the panel data reinforce the conclusion that
the marginal minute of timethatthe average worker spends on breaks is
unproductive (assuming that supply effects are not large), and that there could
bea payoff to resources that employers devote to monitoring workers. As in the
cross-section estimates, here too other (presumably unscheduled) breaks have the
mostnegativeeffect on wages.
I also used GLS to estimate versions of (4) that contain a second-order
approximationto a generalized earnings function in H,, and H1 (analogous tothe
results in Table 3). The marginal effects on earnings of a one-minute increase
in timespentin normal work or in breaks are shown at their minima, means and
maximainTable 7 for both subsamples. These results do not confirm even the
weak findings from the cross section. The marginal effects of additional minutes
ofbreak time aresmall and insignificant over the entire range of break time.
Estimates based on the panel data, from which our estimating procedure removes
potential biases produced by unobserved individual-specific components of wages,
do not indicate that even a low level of time spent on breaks will increase the
productivity of the average worker.
18Table 6
GLS ati.atea of hedonic WaneEquations,1975—76 and 1981fJ
All Kp1oyeee
NormalWork 1.513 x 10 1.513 x IO .972 x 10 .177 x l0
(2.94) (2.88) (1.87) (.35)
All Breaks —.131 x lO4 i.ssn
(—.06) (.67)
Lunch Breaks 939 X 2.781x ur6
(—.23) (.76)
Coffee Breaks 2.347 x 10 .992 x 10
(.45) (.21)
Other Breaks —1.122 x 10 —2.254 x 1O4
(—.25) (—.58)
O .094 .095 .132 .118
2 b,—, .517 .512 .485 .553
Equations also include education, experience, union, marital and
health status, and sex, and a dummy variable for 1981.
Based on i4i differences.Table 7
XffectsonMonthlyPayofOne-4lnitIncreasesin T1.e

















*flaged on an equation with the same controls as in Table 6, but with a
complete second—order approximation on normal work and break time.V. Conclusions and Implicationa
I have found that additional time spent on breaks at work has no effect
on earnings. Employers simply do not pay for increases in time on the job that
is not spent in normal working activities. However, there is some evidence that
time spent on breaks does raise wages: The cross-section results suggest that
the marginal effect of break time on wages is positive among otherwise identical
workers who spend little time on breaks. Moreover, the finding that self-employed
workers do give themselves unscheduled breaks (thougi of much shorter duration
and/or frequency than employees) also suggests that some break time is productive.
tJithin the confines of our key assumption that workers' distastes for time spent
at work are not greatly affected by how that time is spent, the empirical
results support the notion that the marginal minute of break time is unproductive.
For the average worker the results strongly imply that additional time
spent in on-the-job leisure represents shirking rather than productive schmoozing.
This is especially so for nonunion workers. This means that employers have a
substantial incentive to devote resources to monitoring workers' allocations of
time on the job, as time spent on breaks does not add to firms revenues and
does produce costs. To the extent that monitoring can at the margin shift the
time allocations of workers who are paid on a tine-rated basis away from breaks
and toward normalwork,we can infer that at least some monitoring expenditures
can add to profits. The apparent unproductivity of additional break time also
implies that employers have ample latitude for responding to legislated cuts in
standardhours or to higher overtime premia by tightening up their supervision
of break time. The existence of this additional margin means that the employment
effects of such legislation are even more complex than standard labor-demand
models suggest. Finally, the results imply that workers whoobtainadditional
19OTJ leisure at the expense of normal work time will see theirrelative pay fall
(sincetheywould be substituting unproductive for productive work time). To
the extent that OTJleisureis a normal good, an increase in the variance in
full incomes will, other things equal, lead to a smaller increase inthe variance
of observed earnings through this mechanism.
The evidence I have produced is based on cross-section data and does not
speak directly to predicting the effects of the trendtoward steady increases in
the fraction of time on the job that is spent in what I have termedmixed leisure
the interspersing of leisure time with normal working time. Indirectly,
though, the evidence suggests that the trend toward increased mixedleisure is
costly in terms of lost output. People may well choose to spend moretime at
work in activities that are essentially leisure, but that choice comes at the
cost of slower increases in productivity, and hence in living standards,than
would otherwise occur. For the typical worker the U.S. economy is now far past
the point where one can argue that additional break time raises productivity.
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22FOOTNOTES
1. Hersch (1985) did include data on the number of work breaks in an equation
describing the hourly earnings of a small group of piece-rate workers in one plant.
2.Note that here I am no longer assuming that total hours are fixed, as I did
to ease the exposition in Section II.
3. The problems of drawing inferences from more typical hedonic equations are
discussed by Biddle-Zarkin (1987).
4. The exclusions are quite similar to those in Stafford-Duncan (1980b). Their
final subsample contained 375 workers, partly because their hours disqualifiers
were less stringent than the ones I have used.
5. In the 1975-76 data experience was measured as age -education-6.The
provision of additional information in the Panel Study allowed the use of self-
reported years of labor-market experience in 1981.
6. Of the 92 workers in the subsample of the Panel Study, only three, all of
whomwereself-employed, reported any working time at home.
7. Stafford-Duncan (1980b) note the same discrepancy between answers to
questions about weekly hours and totals of time spent at work based on time
diaries.
8. For examples, in the estimates of (4) over the entire subsample the rate of
return to schooling was 6 percent, the union wage premium was 13 percent, and
workers in the South earned 5 percent less than otherwise identical workers.
9. If we split the sample by industry, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
structure of (4) is the same in manufacturing as in the rest of the economy.
The same qualitative conclusions are provided by tests on the subsamples of all
workers and workers who receive only wages or salaries.
10. This is essentially an expanded version of the market loci estimated by
Biddle-Zarkin (1987).
11. This problem is inherent in starting out with a very small basic sample.
Thus Stafford (1987) had only 77 observations from the Panel Study in his work
on two-parent families with young children.
12. The question in the 1975-76 data was, "How many hours do you work in your
main job in an average week?In the 1981 follow-up the question was, "How many
hours did you work in 1980 when you were working?"
13. F.mployment and Earnings, January 1981, January 1982.
14. Whether they represent autocorrelated measurement errors or true observations
cannot be inferred. However, Duncan-Hill (1985) suggest for a similar household
surveythat only part is measurement error.
2315. It is notcompletelyclear whether the error component p refers to the
individualor the match between the individual andthe job. Each interpretation
is probably valid for one part of the subsample but not the other. One should
note, however, that 15 percent of the workers in the subsample changed one-digit
industry between1975-76 and 1981, and undoubtedly manymore changed two- or
three-digitindustries. For at least this group the interpretation should be
thatprepresents an individual effect only.
16.The test is discussed by Judge etal(1980, p. 338).
17.Also included in the estimating equation in addition to the control variables
listed in Table 6 is a duimny variable for 1981. It is worth noting that the OLS
point estimates on the pooled cross-section time-series data differ little from
the CLS estimates presented in the Table. Similarly, the "within" and "between"
estimators suggest the samequalitativeconclusions.
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